Gramatykalizacja i leksykalizacja pojęć a językowy obraz świata.  Szkic o ekwiwalencji kognitywnej by Filar, Dorota Elżbieta & Łozowski, Przemysław
Ethnolinguistics 30 Lublin 2019
I. Articles
DOI: 10.17951/et.2018.30.69
Dorota F i l a r
ORCID: 0000-0003-4692-8894
(UMCS, Lublin, Poland)
Przemysław Ło zowsk i
ORCID: 0000-0001-6685-9713
(UMCS, Lublin, Poland)
On cognitive equivalence:
Grammaticalisation and lexicalisation
in the linguo-cultural worldview∗
Abstract. Cognitive equivalence is posited between grammaticalisation and
lexicalisation as two equivalent ways, or two counterpart cognitive mechanisms,
of expressing conceptualisations in language. It is assumed that grammar and
lexicon constitute a continuum of symbolic structures, contracting specific
correspondences with each other and showing varying degrees of equivalence.
In the analytical part, the paradigm of the linguo-cultural worldview (Polish:
językowy obraz świata, or JOS) comes to the fore, and it is within that framewok
that the research question of how futurity happens to be conceptualised in
selected languages is attempted. The examples come from English, Polish, and
several other European languages.
Key words: grammaticalisation; lexicalisation; cognitive equivalence;
linguo-cultural worldview; linguistic worldview
In the present study, it is assumed that grammatical conceptualisation
(grammaticalisation) and lexical conceptualisation (lexicalisation) are the
two equivalent ways, or two counterpart cognitive mechanisms, of expressing
∗ The present article is a revised and updated translation of its Polish original,
published in Polish as “Gramatykalizacja i leksykalizacja pojęć a językowy obraz świata.
Szkic o ekwiwalencji kognitywnej” in Etnolingwistyka 30. The present English translation
has been financed by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, project titled “English
edition of the journal Etnolingwistyka. Problemy języka i kultury in electronic form” (no.
3bH 15 0204 83). What is novel are references to some of the latest publications on the role
of grammatical data in the worldview research (mainly Section 1), a proposal of a threefold,
rather than twofold, functional equivalence of grammatical and lexical expressions (Section
2), and a general change in tone, from being apologetic, as we evidently are in our Polish
original, about positing the notion of a cognitive equivalence, towards a more assertive and
conclusive stand. This latter point explains why the original Section 2 is not here included.
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“mindsets” in language. In other words, lexicon and grammar are, as we
claim below, equivalent to each other in specific ways, which invites the
image of a continuum as a means of grasping the possibility, or capacity, of
coining elements of one and the same worldview in terms of lexical and/or
grammatical expressions.
We thus side with those linguistic conceptions which posit that grammar
and lexicon constitute a continuum of symbolic structures. As Langacker
(2016: 76) suggests: “language serves the general function of symbolic expres-
sion for purposes of interaction, communication, and thought”. Indeed, what
makes human language symbolic, interpretative, explanative is that the
symbols, interpretations, and explanations that can be found in/behind
linguistic expressions, be they lexically- or grammatically-expressed, are
grounded in and project from the human conceptual world:
[L]anguage not only enables communication, but also reflects mankind’s conceptual
world. The conceptual world consists, amongst others, of conceptual categories, which
are far richer than the system of linguistic signs. A great many, but by no means all, of
the conceptual categories give rise to linguistic categories. Linguistic categories not only
enable us to communicate, but also impose a certain way of understanding the world.
(Dirven and Verspoor 2004: 1)
According to this reading, no matter whether lexical or grammatical,
linguistic categories appear to constitute a unique “road map” for reconstruc-
ting the conceptualisations that build up our worldview. Or, to paraphrase
Dirven and Verspoor’s words, if a given language discloses the mentality
of its users, this is so because this mentality is reflected as much in the
grammar as in the lexicon of that language. So, reconstructing one’s worl-
dview, at least within the methodology of the linguo-cultural worldview
research (henceforth: JOS)1 consists in, say, “getting the message” behind
the available linguistic data of whichever kind.2
1. Lexical and grammatical resources in reconstructing JOS
Nevertheless, of the two traditionally-recognised resources of language, it
is usually content (lexical) expressions, rather than function (grammatical)
1 As we set our argumentation in the context of and in relation to the research
methodology known in Polish as językowo-kulturowy obraz świata (or JOS for short,
the linguo-cultural worldview) and practised by the Lublin-based School of Cognitive
Ethnolinguistics, we will use the JOS acronym as a reference term.
2 Naturally, this does not mean that while reconstructing the JOS, one can unmistakably
arrive at all possible linguistic narrations which have motivated grammatical elements of
a language, especially if this motivation is a matter of remote past. Still, an attempt to
identify and explain conceptual grounding of grammar is certainly tempting and worth
pursuing. For the conception of language as “grand narration”, see Filar 2013.
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ones, that are found worth examining for the sake of reconstructing JOS.
As Pajdzińska (2001: 247) makes it plain:
[although] cognitive linguistics has once and for all questioned the validity of the
grammar-lexicon separation, thus positing that language is a continuum of symbolic
structures, in practice while doing a linguistic reconstruction of extra-linguistic objects,
i.e. as they happen to be recognised, conceptualised, categorised and what values they
are ascribed with in language (. . . ), it is typically the lexical kind of data that is subject
to scrutiny.3
This is not to say that grammatical considerations have been utterly
ignored by the Polish researchers of JOS. For example, Grzegorczykowa
(1990: 43) would emphasise the role of “grammatical features (morphological
categories) in reflecting the living conditions of a given speaking community
and, thus, in shaping the worldview of the users of a given language”.
Anusiewicz et al. (2000: 31) would go as far as to claim, after Humboldt,
evidently, that “grammar, rather than lexicon, is closer to the spirit of
its nation”. Accordingly, their JOS-oriented research programme is said to
involve inflexion, grammatical gender, word-formation processes and other
grammatical categories (ibid., p. 31). Libura (2000: 125) seems to adhere
to both Whorf’s and Halliday’s perspectives when she writes that it is not
lexicon but grammar, as a coherent system, that may provide us with a much
more systematised insight on how a given community sees the world (Whorf)
and that grammar can be regarded as “a metaphorical model of the perceived
world” because grammar keeps on evolving proportionately to the evolution
of the corresponding community (Halliday).
A further indication as to the place and role of grammar in the Polish
JOS research can be found in the definitions of JOS itself. While JOS had
once a clearly lexical bias, the essence of research being “the lexicon (. . . )
as a component of a given culture, with linguistic substance, not linguistic
forms, coming to the fore” (Bartmiński 1980: 10), it has since then been
given a lexical-grammatical dimension:
What lies at the heart of ethnolinguistics and what delimits its scope of research
is the notion of the linguistic worldview, this view being naïve in nature, fundamental
for structuring language, and encoded in grammatical structures and word meanings as
well as in structures and meanings of texts. (Bartmiński 1988: 5, in the first issue of the
journal Etnolingwistyka)4
3 Most recently, Pajdzińska seems to have ascribed this relative precedence of lexicon
over grammar in reconstructing JOS also to the fact that “an average language user is
typically unaware of any distinction between a given language’s grammatical system and
its vocabulary, which makes him/her think that it is exclusively lexical items that can be
meaning carriers” (Pajdzińska, this volume).
4 A similar lexical-grammatical conception of JOS stems from Tokarski (2001: 366;
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Of the most recent attempts at including grammatical considerations
into the JOS description, Wierzbicka (this volume) discusses an English-
specific sense of entitlement, as in my breakfast, my newspaper, my dinner
etc. Whenever the sense of entitlement is involved in these expressions, its
linguistic marker is not my as a lexical element, but my as a grammatical
one. That is why this “grammatical” my has a limited distribution and scope
of application, and it relates specifically to, as Wierzbicka puts it, “Anglo
‘rules of the game’ [which] include (. . . ) personal routines, especially common
daily routines (. . . )” (ibid.).
Pajdzińska (this volume) examines the category of grammatical gender
in order to illustrate the claim that “the grammar of a given language (. . . )
encodes a specific inventory of meanings characteristic of that language”, and,
more specifically, that “grammatical gender partially determines metaphorical
correspondences and curtails metaphorical possibilities”.
The category of number, yet another phenomenon which is traditionally-
recognised as purely grammatical, has been examined by Nowosad-
Bakalarczyk (this volume). Her research accords rather closely with our
argumentation below in the sense that assuming the gramaticalisation-
lexicalisation continuum, she seems to favour the from-lexicalisation-to-
grammaticalisation orientation, with her research questions being “what
substance has happened to be expressed in language, how this substance is
encoded in language, what linguistic forms it has been given, and what has
motivated these processes” (ibid.).
That one and the same substance may well be expressed grammatically
as much as lexically projects from Szadura’s (2017) monographic account
of the category of time in Polish. Assuming that time has a linguo-cultural
dimension, Szadura shows that various aspects of time, such as past, present,
future, antecedence etc., happen to be given both lexical and grammatical
expression. In her methodological premises, she follows cognitive linguistics
and, thus, assumes that language is a way of understanding the world and
examines grammar and lexicon in terms of a semantic continuum.
This brings us to our pivotal notion here, the one of cognitive equivalence,
or, to grasp the dynamicity of the process, of cognitive “equivalentisation”.
emphasis added): “[JOS is] a set of regularities encoded in categorical relations of grammar
(such as inflexion, word-formation, syntax) as well as in semantic structures of the lexicon,
this all, first, disclosing language-specific ways of how respective components of the world
are perceived and, second, reflecting a more general understanding of how the world is
structured (. . . )”.
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2. Cognitive equivalence: in-between lexicalisation and
grammaticalisation
Our argumentation so far amounts to the observation that humans
evidently cherish the prospect of expressing their conceptual world in the
language they use (see Section 1). This process (of linguistic conceptuali-
sation) may be given two basic orientations, depending on what kind of
linguistic forms it is that concepts are expressed with. There is, then, (i)
lexical conceptualisation if it is lexical expressions that our thoughts are
“translated” into, and (ii) grammatical conceptualisation if our thinking
is “rendered” by means of grammatical expressions. Figure 1 attempts to
illustrate this functional equivalence of (i) and (ii): lexical and grammatical
expressions are equivalent, first, in the sense that they are linguistic ren-
derings of the respective elements of the conceptual world and, second, in
the sense that they may as well be equivalent to each other. The latter case
involves a situation when one and the same conceptual substance may be
expressed lexically as much as grammatically.5
Figure 1. Lexical and grammatical orientations of linguistic conceptualisation
Moreover, the process of expressing thoughts in language does not stop
once concepts have been given their lexical or grammatical equivalents, but
it may linger on to the effect that (iii) hitherto lexical units acquire some
grammatical function, and (iv) hitherto grammatical units develop some
lexical status, as shown in Figure 2.
5 Take Polish (and other inflectional languages) where the speaking subject can be
identified with either a personal pronoun or an inflectionally-marked verb-form. Both of
these, the lexeme and the inflectional morpheme, prove to be linguistic equivalents of the
same conceptual substance and also appear functionally equivalent to each other. (Cf.
GWJP-M 1984: 143–146.)
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Figure 2. Linguistic conceptualisation: in-between grammar and lexicon
This gives cognitive equivalence yet another (third) dimension, resulting
ultimately in three idealisations: with regard to each other, lexical and
grammatical units may be
– parallel (conceptual content > lexical expressions or grammatical
expressions),
– crisscrossing (conceptual content > lexical expressions and grammatical
expressions), and
– reversible and bidirectional (lexical expressions >< conceptual content
>< grammatical expressions).6
It is this latter reading of grammatical conceptualisation, or grammatica-
lisation for short (see (i > iii) in Figure 2), and of lexical conceptualisation, or
lexicalisation for short (see (ii > iv) in Figure 2) that is of primary importance
in the present contribution. As processes of linguistic re-conceptualisation,
a change which is both linguistic as much as conceptual, the two take place
once concepts have found their original linguistic equivalents.
Why should we attempt to relate grammaticalisation and lexicalisation
in terms of cognitive equivalence/equivalentisation? First of all, equiva-
lence here is not restricted to fidelity-versus-naturalness correspondences
between respective elements of related texts, as in translation studies (cf.
Tabakowska 1993), or to synonymy-calibrated sense relations between le-
xemes, as in lexical semantics (cf. Bogusławski 1988: 64), or as (partial)
structural and semantic identity between segments, or elements, of a given
text, as in an ethnolinguistically-oriented analysis of oral texts patterns (cf.
Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska 2007: 362). As signalled already above, on our
6 For the moment we shall consider it remains open to debate whether concepts can be
grounded in their grammatical equivalents in a direct and unmediated way as they appear
to be in the case of lexical expressions. The question mark on the side of grammatical
conceptualisation (see (ii) in Figure 2) is meant to represent our agnostic position in that
respect.
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reading, equivalence is given a wider perspective of universal cognitive and
cultural grounding, thus amounting to an all-embracing property of the mind
and capturing the human capacity to express coherent world judgements
by means of, among other things, parallel, crisscrossing, and/or reversible
linguistic means, two of them being grammaticalisation and lexicalisation.
For some (experiential) reasons, language users find it necessary and use-
ful not only to voice their conceptualisations in grammatical constructions
and in lexical units, but also to re-conceptualise the conceptual content of
either of the two for one to become the other. In this sense, lexicon is an
equivalent of grammar, and grammar is an equivalent of lexicon. It seems
that equivalence here has to do with some propensity and predilection of the
human mind to search for, identify, and bring together diverse entities for
their conceptual content to be given a better, or a more adequate, expression
of the underlying mentalities.
Let us now comment briefly on how we understand grammaticalisation
and lexicalisation.
2.1. Grammaticalisation
Our understanding of grammaticalisation follows Kuryłowicz’s (1975
[1965]: 52) original conception of the phenomenon:
Grammaticalisation consists in the increase of the range of a morpheme advancing
from a lexical to a grammatical or from a less grammatical to a more grammatical status,
e.g. from a derivat[ional] (. . . ) formant to an inflectional one.
On close reading, Kuryłowicz distinguishes two specific cases of gramma-
ticalisation, both aiming at diminishing lexical and increasing grammatical
contents of forms, yet to varying degrees.
By means of illustrating these two cases, here is a brief note on the origin
of the English articles. The present-day English indefinite article a/an, as in
a boy and an apple, goes back to the Old English (OE) numeral an /a:n/
‘one’ (cf. Traugott and Trousdale 2013: 32), whereas the definite article the,
as in the boy and the apple, derives from the Old English neuter indicative
pronoun and gender marker þæt (rel. to Pol. to (dziecko) and Germ. das
(Kind) ‘this child’). So, in these two examples, we have a change, respectively,
of a numeral into an article (OE an > a/an) and of a pronoun/gender marker
into an article (OE þæt > the).
Now, trying to identify which of Kuryłowicz’s two cases of grammaticali-
sation (i.e. lexical > grammatical and less grammatical > more grammatical)
should be paired with which of our examples may be a daunting task, as
this ultimately depends on how we define grammar and lexicon. Yet, the
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difference in the more-or-less grammatical status of the source and the target
forms seems to be relatively evident. Namely, unlike the target category (ar-
ticles), both of the source categories (numeral and pronoun/gender marker)
remain in a defined relation with one’s tangible or physical experience, or,
in other words, with direct designating and naming objects in the world. In
this sense, one in one boy and this/that in this/that boy point to physically-
delimited and experientially-real objects. Moreover, although their meanings
do not seem to be context-free, one and this/that do not depend on the
actual structural configuration of a given expression as much as the articles
do. Without a context, the English articles a/an and the must be said either
to have no independent (lexical) meaning at all, or to be significantly less
independent than their historical antecedents, an and þæt. To conclude, in
comparison to their OE source categories, articles are more grammatical,
or more grammaticalised. Numerals and (demonstrative) pronouns, in turn,
prove to be less grammatical, or less grammaticalised, if not just lexical, in
their categorial status than the articles.
Nevertheless, as we attempt a continuum interpretation of the lexicalisa-
tion-grammaticalisation cognitive equivalence, the most important point here
is not structurally-delimited source-target parameters of what changes into
what, but conceptual factors that motivate that which eventually emerges
as changes in forms and meanings. And thus, the cognitive inference behind
bringing the OE numeral for ‘one’ to the position of the indefinite article for
‘some, any’ is this: “if a given object is referred to as one of a set of similar
or same objects, that means that the reference is indefinite (because vague,
general, indeterminate etc.)”. The cognitive inference behind developing the
definite article for ‘defined, identified’ out of the demonstrative form for ‘this,
that’ can, in turn, be phrased as follows: “if a given object is referred to in
terms of pointing to, or indexing, or other means of highlighting, that means
that the reference is definite (because clear, specific, determinate etc.)”. As
in visual perception, cognitive equivalence binds the indistinct with the
indefinite by virtue of ‘some/any’ conceptualisation (e.g. I can see some . . . ),
and the distinct with the definite by virtue of ‘this/that’ conceptualisation
(I can see this . . . ).
2.2. Lexicalisation
As to lexicalisation, we take it to stand for any change, mechanism, or
process, that results in a novel lexical element, the target being a lexical
expression (i) or (iv), as in Figure 2. Yet, as we specifically focus here
on the changes (i) > (iii) and (ii) > (iv), by analogy to Kuryłowicz’s
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grammaticalisation, lexicalisation is taken to involve a change consisting in
a relative increase of the lexical status of a given linguistic element, that is
either grammatical > lexical or less lexical > more lexical.
This seems to accord with, or at least correspond to, Doroszewski’s
idea of lexicalisation as derived from lexical formations from syntactic
structures so that the novel (lexical) element finds its origin in some syntactic
(grammatical) structure, as, for example, pływak ‘swimmer’ derives from
the construction ‘the one that/who swims’ (cf. Lewicki 2001: 639). A similar
syntactic > lexical change can be found in generative linguists’ claim that
lexicalisation “is a particular kind of transformational process” (Lyons 1977:
114), where several original deep structure “sense-components” turn into
a lexeme, as in CAUSE + BECOME + NOT + ALIVE > KILL. Naturally,
neither Doroszewski nor generativists would allow for cultural and conceptual
considerations to play their role in motivating the Polish pływak or the
English kill, both being outcomes of intralinguistic and systemic forces,
but what matters here is that for their proponents both positions present
lexicalisation as a shift form the grammatical to the lexical.7
An example comes with the Polish -izm formant (Eng. -ism, Span.
-ismo). A suffix and a bound morpheme, -izm is one of the formal exponents
of the nomen essendi category involving names of distinctive doctrines,
practices, philosophical systems, political ideologies, such as rasizm ‘racism’,
mistycyzm ‘mysticism’, naturalism ‘naturalism’, marksizm ‘Marxism’ etc.
However, despite its originally purely grammatical status, -izm has recently
been perceived to have so much of lexical substance that it may well be used
as a lexeme, or at least as an independent component of a text. Take this
example in Polish:
7 This understanding of lexicalisation departs from the (prevailing) one that presents it
in terms of a form-substance split, or “loosening the relations between the morphological
structure of a word-form and its meaning” (cf. Słownik terminów gramatycznych). So,
lexicalisation can be claimed whenever language users can no longer perceive the original
motivation behind given lexical formations, as in piwnica ‘cellar, basement’ originally
related to piwo ‘beer’, górnik ‘(coal) miner’ to góry ‘mountains’, wątek ‘plot/storyline’
to tkać ‘to weave’, or wątroba ‘liver’ to wnętrze ‘interior’. These cases may well be
metaphorical extensions or elaborations and in that sense illustrate cognitive equivalence –
that is, language users perceive some conceptual similarity, or common conceptual basis,
between what is already named (góry) and what is to be named (górnik) and they
elaborate on or extend the given (góry) for the sake of the emergent (górnik), yet none of
them is an example of lexicalisation as long as they – lexical expressions, no doubt – do
not derive from grammatical expressions, or at least, from expressions of a less lexical
status than themselves.
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Na początku nadrealizm oznaczał sprzeciw wobec zastanych konwencji w sztuce,
a dokładniej wobec pięciu „izmów”: klasycyzmu, realizmu, empiryzmu, racjonalizmu,
utylitaryzmu (http://dwudziestolecie-miedzywojenne.klp.pl/a–8708.html).
‘At the beginning surrealism meant a dissent against the existing conventions in
art, specifically against the five “isms”: classicism, realism, empiricism, rationalism, and
utilitarianism.’
As it appears, in this particular illustration, the lexical independence
if -izm seems to be only partial. If it were complete, the expression would
not be given in quotation marks and, possibly, would not be followed by
a meticulous enumeration of the five corresponding terms. This means that
the author does not recognise fully the lexemic status of izm, but, rather,
treats it as part of the wordplay that consists in an agreed-on, or contextually
negotiated, conventional character of izm. Still, the fact remains that izmy is
here given its genitive plural form (izmów) as if it was a regular Polish noun.
What, then, is the status of -izm in present-day Polish? As Jadacka
(2001) observes, the highly productive morpheme -izm is now frequently used
to form surnames-based derivatives, the surnames being those of politicians,
artists etc. According to her, “the collision of the ‘intellectual’ suffix with the
every-day reality symbolised with a given topical surname gives the whole
structure some depreciating, or jocular, colloquial character” (ibid., p. 83).
This may be parallel to the changes in the meaning of the word doktryna
‘doctrine’ which seems to serve as a kind of underlying conceptual base for
the izm-marked derivatives. Doktryna has recently developed a semantic
nuance of “a word used disapprovingly”, similarly to the related adjective
doktrynalny and the adverb doktrynalnie: “What can be called doktryna is
one’s unfounded or experience-discordant views and claims used to legitimise
something” (ISJP Bańko 2000). If so, the noun doktryna can be said to
have been partially reconceptualised as a result of the Polish language users’
attempts at finding a more expressive equivalent for that part of the import
of the noun that implies negative connotations. The resulting noun izm
has become a carrier of contextually-acquired meanings which disclose an
attitude of jocularity, irony, or irreverence with regard to one’s ideas and
beliefs.8
8 Take this humorous ditty by Apolinary Polek: “Biega, krzyczy pani Magda: / ‘Gdzie
jest obiektywna prawda?” ’ / Szuka w jodze i w buddyzmie, / W jednym izmie, w drugim
izmie. [. . . ]” (apolinary.pl/wiersze/; Eng. “Maggie’s shouting all around / ‘Where can
truth be found?’ / Is this yoga, is this Buddhism? / It’s this ism, or another ism?”). The
jocular status seems to be recognised also in the English noun ism. In some of the EFL
dictionaries, ism is labelled “humorous” (CALD online) or “derogatory” (OALD online),
and defined in terms of beliefs, “especially ones that you disapprove of” (CALD online)
or “especially when you think that they are not sensible or practical” (LDCE online).
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Dictionaries of contemporary Polish have evidently recognised the lexical
autonomy of izm, so that having shifted from a purely grammatical position of
a morphological suffix, it can now be given a fully-fledged nominal definition,
as in ISJP Bańko (2000): “a jocular designation of some doctrine, theory,
art movement etc.” (cf. also SWJP Dun). To sum up, in the process of
partial reconceptualisation, izm, originally a morphological equivalent of
some conceptual substance, has gradually assumed the status of a lexical
equivalent of both its grammatical exponency of the nomen essendi category
as well as of the sarcastic overtones of doktryna.
One way or another, however reconceptualised and lexicalised, -izm has
not lost its word-formation capacity and still functions as a highly productive
suffix, which brings us to more complex examples of the lexicalisation-
grammaticalisation continuum.
2.3. Grammaticalisation and lexicalisation: in search of
a continuum
Indeed, while the English articles appear to be a straightforward illu-
stration of grammaticalisation in the sense that a/an and the can hardly be
presented to have any lexical substance in present-day English at all, the izm
example shows some bifurcation effect at the moment, exemplifying both
lexical and grammatical dimensions in specific contexts. In their respective
terms, both examples do illustrate not only that grammaticalisation and
lexicalisation result in linguistic equivalents of the corresponding conceptual
substance, or that the two can be equivalent to each other, but also that
this cognitive equivalence constitutes a continuum. Let us now explore these
findings with some further evidence from English.
The present-day English always ‘every time, all the time’ is a historical
continuation of OE ealneweg ‘app. all (the) way’ supplied at the beginning of
the 15th c. with the genitive marker -s, whereas already ‘before/earlier than
the time in question’ goes back to the Middle English (MidE) contraction
of all and ready (cf. Chaucer’s alredi), meaning literally ‘fully ready’, that
is ‘being prepared’, as of a horse available for riding. Both of these two
adverbs may be regarded as examples of lexicalisation because no matter
which word-formation process(es) we actually agree upon as the mechanism
behind their origins (compounding and/or derivation), English no doubt did
acquire two novel lexemes, always and already.
Still, there is a grammaticalisation part in all this as well. The morpho-
logical and typological issues aside, what comes to the fore on our reading
of the lexicalisation-grammaticalisation cognitive equivalence is experiential
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motivation which seems to have facilitated the diagnosed changes. Most
generally, the historical developments that we find in always and already are
based on inferencing about time from what is experientially known about
space. Specifically, what seems to have led the speakers of English to coin
the adverbs always and already, as we use them today, is the respective
experiential inferences: “if something happens on ‘all the ways’ in the sense
of ‘everywhere’, that means that it happens at all times” (always), and
“if something or somebody is nothing but ‘all ready’ in the sense of being
completely prepared, that means that something or somebody is prepared
to act before the time expected”. At the simplest, living in and experiencing
space invites and permits making conjectures about what living in and
experiencing time might be like.9
In other words, equivalence here consists in expressing the concepts of, say,
‘all-presence’ and ‘all-readiness’ by means of reconceptualising the available
lexical resources in the domain of space into the emergent grammatical
resources in the domain of time. Whatever happens is some kind of cognitive
equivalentisation: in human subjective and relative experience, grammar
and lexicon prove to be equivalent to each other as much as space and
time do. This is to say that the linguistic expressions bearing witness
to the space-time continuum, the grammar-lexicon continuum, and the
lexicalisation-grammaticalisation continuum are all products of one and
the same mental capacity of the human mind which, as Heine and Kuteva
(2002: 5) once called it, is “a strategy of linguistic processing whereby more
abstract functions are expressed in terms of forms for concrete concepts”.
The whole idea behind from-the-lexical-to-the-grammatical orientation of
cognitive equivalence, as in always and already, is that once we are in need
of conceptualising what is unknown, remote, or, simply, escapes our concrete
(somatic, physical, unmediated) experience (here: time), we rely on what is
known, close and available to us (here: space). Temporal expressions are,
on the whole, more abstract and, thus, more grammatical(ised) than the
spatial ones, whereas spatial expressions are more concrete and, thus, more
lexical(ised) than the temporal ones.
What is worth emphasising is that always and already present the co-
gnitive equivalence of the grammaticalisation orientation as much as the
English articles do, and of the lexical orientation as much as the case of
izm/ism does, which makes them less clear-cut in their respective deve-
lopments. On the one hand, they can still be analysable in purely lexical
9 Naturally, expressing temporal experience in terms of spatial experience is a very
well recognised cognitive mechanism, for which see, in the first place, Lakoff and Johnson
(1980) and, for Polish or in Polish, Szadura (2017) and Łozowski (2018).
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terms, as, respectively, all+ways and all+ready, yet, on the other hand,
their adverbial status must be recognised as, again, purely grammatical. In
short, neither has their original lexical conceptualisation utterly “bleached”,
nor their present-day grammatical conceptualisation completely “coloured”.
One needs to be prepared, then, for more or less of grammaticalisation and
lexicalisation in the way cognitive equivalence works, which we take to be
a true and expected characteristic of any continuum.
In the analytical part now, we attempt to exemplify all of our theoretical
considerations with how futurity happens to be conceptualised in selected
languages. As intended, the developments discussed below are meant to
illustrate the role of grammaticalisation in the overall scheme of cognitive
equivalentisation, and to offer generalisations as to the “grammatical tools”
that linguistic reconceptualisation consists in for the expression of futurity.
3. Futurity as a collectively-driven grammaticalisation of
lexical resources
As Szadura (2017: 107) asserts, for the conceptualiser, the present is
tangible, clearly situated in awareness, and available to sensory experience:
“ ‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’ constitute a triad of the sensory-based fundamental
concepts”. It is then the present that in most languages serves the purposes
of a self-evident, natural, egocentric starting point for conceptualising time.
With regard to the present, the future is already an abstract notion elusive
of any “here and now” experience. Instead, thinking in terms of the future
employs imagination, requires making inferences and projections, while
verbalising futurity involves complex mental operations which allow for
expressing all of that in words. The reason why we scrutinise linguistic
expressions of futurity, to be remembered, is that this is believed to reveal
some of the re-conceptualisation mechanisms of cognitive equivalence to the
benefit of conceptualising what goes beyond one’s direct sensory experience,
i.e. the future, in terms of what projects from one’s direct sensory experience,
e.g., the present.
3.1. Expressing futurity in English and Polish
One notable example of this present-future correlation is English, where
there are just two grammatical tenses, that is, two morphologically-marked
ways of making time references: the present and the past. In practice,
then, whatever verb-form we may consider, it can never indicate any future
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reference by the form itself. For example, none of the available forms of the
strong (irregular) verb to write – write, writes, wrote, writing, written –
indicates any futurity, the first two forms grounding an action in the present,
the third – in the past, and the latter two being timeless participles. Similarly,
the available forms of the weak (regular) verb to love – love, loves, loved,
loving – can mark either the present, or the future, or make no time reference
at all. Instead of a morphologically-marked future tense, English makes use
of a number of analytical constructions, the to be going to construction and
the will construction serving a vast majority of future references.
These two constructions illustrate the process of grammaticalisation; the
elements that provide the formal and the substantive basis for both of them,
i.e. will and go, used to be purely lexical elements, that is, verbs having their
concrete lexically-definable senses, ‘want, desire, intend’ and ‘move from
one place to another’, respectively, and being conjugated, thus subject to
grammatical calibration as to the tense, number, and person. So, by means
of experimenting, if we were to reconstruct the original import in I will
read a book tomorrow and I am going to read a book tomorrow, we would
need to understand that the former means ‘I want/intend to read a book
tomorrow’ and the latter, literally, ‘I am just moving (or: I am in the process
of moving/leaving) in order to read a book tomorrow’.10
Naturally, both will and go have retained some traces of their original
meanings, which is why the will construction as well as the to be going to
construction are constrained semantically, syntactically, and contextually.
After all, it is only in their respective future-oriented constructions that will
and go have their grammatical function which they do not show anywhere
else. Yet, the lexical meanings are here “bleached” to such a degree that one
can safely assume that will and go are nothing but grammaticalised.
Now, can we at all identify any cross-generational experiential inferences
at work behind the grammaticalisation of will and go, as in their future-
marking constructions? Even if this is merely hypothetical or cannot be
falsified in rigid terms, it is quite plausible to assume that what led to the
grammaticalisation of will is experiencing desire, intention, determination, or
just willpower in terms of the expected outcomes and effects. Experientially,
then, desiring something means placing the object of desire already in the
space of futurity, as if determination alone could project the course of coming
events. Needless to say, the present-day speakers of English are not really
10 The same holds true for the imperfective aspect, as in I will be reading a book
tomorrow and I am going to be reading a book tomorrow. Here again, the historical sense
behind one and the other is that of one’s present, immediate, or “here and now”, being in
the process of intending something and moving somewhere, respectively.
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aware of that, historically, their will construction does not project any future
event, but simply expresses one’s overwhelming and irresistible desire for
this event to happen.11
Projecting futurity as intention from experiencing the immediate pre-
sent lies at the root of the grammaticalisation of go in the to be going to
construction as well. Yet, this time the experiential inference is not a matter
of desire, but seems to have to do, first, with space-based conceptualisation
of time. More specifically, the cognitively-oriented moving ego model for
time (cf. Evans 2007: 64) may be called to play its role: an image of the
conceptualiser moving through the space of time, from the present to the
future, frames “a temporal reference [in order] ‘to locate’ events by virtue of
their relationship to the subjective experience of now or the present” (ibid.).
Second, what matters here is, as Hopper and Traugott (2003: 3) assert,
making “inference of futurity from purposiveness”: if one is physically and li-
terally going (in the sense of moving in space) with the purpose, or intention,
of doing something, then this purpose must be not only settled, specific, and
definite, but also fixed and immediate. Evidently, the conceptualiser is so
much purpose-focused in his/her intentions that the directed purpose itself
projects futurity.
To sum up, the linguistic view of futurity in English which emerges
from the grammaticalisation developments of the will and the to be going to
constructions is this: the future is the present desire, intention, goal-directed,
purposeful activity, projected as oncoming events. Despite their completely
unrelated lexical sources, the two constructions are thus brought together
by the operation of cognitive equivalence as expressions of one and the same
panchronic drive at inferencing about an opportunity window for future
events from how they are experienced, or, rather, what they are experienced
like, as present events. However cognitively equivalent, these constructions
are not synonymous or identical (inasmuch as the present and the future
are not synonymous or identical). Although intention is the most underlying
aspect of both constructions, the “intended” future of the will kind is what
one wishes for, whereas the “intended” future of the to be going to kind is
what is already on its way. The former future is merely conceived, and the
latter is already emerging. That is why Hopper and Traugott (2003: 1-3)
allow for If interest rates are going to climb, we’ll have to change our plans,
but not for *If interest rates will climb, we’ll have to change our plans.
As to Polish, there are many analytical constructions serving futurity as
well, some of which seem to be akin to the English to be going to, as in iść
11 The element of volition is still salient in some of the will-based derivations: willing,
willing to, willingness, willingly.
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coś zrobić ‘to be going in order to do something’. For example, Idę odrobić
lekcje ‘I am going to do my homework’ means that one is leaving/departing
from one’s actual location with the immediate intention of doing something.
Unlike English, however, Polish has a morphologically-marked composite
future tense which is composed of two elements, the auxiliary być ‘be’ and
the main verb. The auxiliary is given a future form marked for the person
and the number (będę / będziesz / będzie / będziemy / będziecie / będą,
all corresponding to the invariant will be in English) and “bleached” of its
lexical meaning ‘exist’ which it shows otherwise as a main verb, its function
being that of a grammatical marker of futurity. The other element of the
Polish composite future tense, i.e. the main verb, can appear either in its
infinitival or its past participle forms, as in – for the 3rd person masculine
singular – będzie pisać and będzie pisał, both meaning ‘he will write/be
writing’. According to Rospond (1962: 85), these two alternative forms have
been available “in Polish since the earliest times”.
Again, as in English, we can attempt some collective and cross-
generational mentality as an account of how futurity has happened to be
conceptualised in Polish. Yet, the inference behind the grammaticalisation
of the Polish być ‘to be’ as an auxiliary is not motivated by volition, as in
will, or by a metaphor of traveling in time pictured as bodily approximating
some point in space, as in to be going to. Polish seems to have recorded an
idea of an event being time-shifted, this event being an entity that will “be”,
or will “exist”, so that somebody or something will physically be placed in
future, or will literally exist in future, performing an activity some time from
now. This is a kind of translocation, as in the English to be going to, but
there is no mention of an action being in any progress, or of future being
approximated anyhow. Futurity here is simply the present me/you/us etc.
time-shifted into the future, or, in other words, an asserted projection of
what something or somebody is (doing) now, which – without taking it too
far – presents the future as a projected representation of the present. That
is why, as we claim, unlike the English constructions, the Polish composite
future tense captures futurity in terms of an unmediated shift in time.
Naturally, this all invites further questions: are the inferences identified
for English and Polish specifically limited to these two respective languages,
or can they be generalised as some transnational heritage? By means of
attempting these and related issues, in what follows we examine briefly ways
of expressing futurity in some other languages and offer what we hope can
be working hypotheses about how cognitive equivalence in general and the
lexicalisation-grammmaticalisation interface in specific find their expression
in language.
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3.2. Futurity as an implementation of desire and intention
Jakubowicz (2014) describes forms of the analytically-constructed future
tense in the languages identified historically with the Balkan League, that is
Bulgarian, Macedonian, Albanian, Romanian, and Greek.12 To a considerable
degree, their future tenses are based on the grammaticalisation of the form
that used to mean ‘want’. So, as much as in English, the original meaning
was bleached of its lexical attributes and started to serve the grammatical
function of marking futurity. The forms in question involve the following: šte
< chošte orig. ‘want’ in Bulgarian (e.g., azštepiša ‘I will write’), the same
with the particle k’e in Macedonian (e.g., jask’epišam ‘I will write’), tha
as a shortened form of thelo ‘I want’ in Greek (e.g., ego tha agrafo ‘I will
write’), and do < duaj ‘want’ in Albanian (e.g., unë do të shkruaj ‘I will
write’). Similarly, in Serbian and Croatian the particle ću < hoću ‘want’ is
typically used to form the future tense.
3.3. Futurity as a movement towards an oncoming events
Neither is the English to be going to construction unparalleled in other
languages, as a way of expressing futurity. The moving ego model for time
and the related grammaticalised meanings of the verb to go can be found,
for example, in French. One of the means of forming the future tense (futur
proche) in French consists in the analytical construction that has resulted
from a partial “bleaching” of the lexical meaning of the verb aller ‘to go’
calibrated for person and number and accompanied with the infinitive, as
in Je vais ecrire ‘I will write’.13 A similar situation can be identified in
other Romance languages. For example, the Spanish Presente de Indicativo
involves a periphrastic future tense construction which combines a finite
form of the grammaticalised verb ir ‘to go’, the preposition a, and the main
verb in its infinitival form, as in voy a escribir ‘I will write’. (Compare this
with the analogous vou escrever ‘I will write’ in Portuguese.)
3.4. Futurity as where we will once be, or what we will once
become
As in Polish, in most of the other Slavic languages, the analytical future
tense is formed by means of finite forms of the grammaticalised verb for
12 All the examples from the Balkan languages are quoted after Jakubowicz.
13 We are also familiar with the claim that in some contexts the French Je vais ecrire
should be understood more literally as ‘I am going to write’, vais showing the lexical
dimension of a physical movement.
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‘to be’ followed by the main verb. For example, Ja budu pisať in Russian,
Budem písať in Slovak, or Budu psát in Czech, correspond closely to Będę
pisać in Polish ‘I will write’.14 A similar mechanism can be found in German,
but the grammaticalised verb means ‘to become’, or ‘to come into existence’
(werden), rather than ‘to be’, as in Ich werde schreiben ‘I will write’. This
presents the German-engrained futurity as what one will once come to be,
rather than where one will once be.
4. Concluding remarks
The objective in this contribution has been to present the role of, respec-
tively, grammar and lexicon in the JOS research, that is, what grammatical
and lexical constructs can reveal about how language users understand the
world. This aim has brought us to the prospect of treating grammar and
lexicon as functionally-equivalent exponents of linguistic conceptualisation,
which has been attempted here with regard to selected examples of the
grammaticalisation-lexicalisation continuum, borderline or transition cases
included. However tentative our proposal may be at the moment, it is safe
to assume that grammatical conceptualisation proves to be as promising
a source of the worldview knowledge as the lexical one. Indeed, our analytical
part on the means of expressing futurity in selected European languages se-
ems to justify the prospect of a comparative study of grammatical categories
as overt expressions of conceptualisation. The starting point for such a study
could be a detailed typology of world languages (cf. Majewicz 1989), with
the end point being hypotheses about cognitive inferences which respective
linguo-cultural communities have come to make in order to express their
mentalities. The operational mechanism in all that, as we propose, should be
cognitive equivalence, that is, a never-ending process of giving appropriate
grammatical and/or lexical equivalents of how humans conceptualise, or
understand, the world they live in. The notion of cognitive equivalence has
merely been sketched here and needs further elaboration, yet we think it
provides a novel and intriguing perspective on language.
Translated by Przemysław Łozowski
14 Czech uses perfective-imperfective forms like most Slavic languages to distinguish
between present activities and future actions. However, if napišu means ‘I’ll write, I’m
going to write’, budu psat means ‘I will be in the process of writing’ and is therefore used
much less.
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